its unicameral 386-member parlament: voting for single candidates from SMD contests, list voting for parties in larger territorial districts using proportional rules to award seats from party lists, and proportionally allocated compensation seats from national compensation lists. The rst two levels each require a ballot while the national compensation list uses surplus" votes not counted at the primary levels.
In each SMD, candidates compete directly, and each v oter chooses his or her most preferred candidate on the ballot. Candidates may be nominated by parties or may run as independents. The candidate with the most votes wins, although if no candidate obtains more than half of the votes in a rst round of voting then a run-o election is held two or three weeks later. The top three candidates and any candidate with more than 15 percent of the vote compete in the run-o election, in which the top vote-getter wins the seat.
Hungary's electoral map is also divided into 20 electoral territories which correspond to county borders. Voters elect a maximum of 152 candidates from the territories, with speci c seat awards made to candidates according to their rank on lists submitted by parties in each territory. The number of seats available in each territory varies from 4 to 28, with a median of 6. Ballots in territories are counted according to party, and seats are then distributed according to a special version of the largest-remainder proportional representation PR formula. The Hungarian method places a limit on the allocation of remainder seats that excludes parties whose remainder votes are less than two-thirds of the quota calculated in that district. Known as the two-thirds limit," this inevitably causes there to remain unawarded seats in the territory, which then are added to the pool of seats to beawarded from the national list.
Finally, the electoral law reserves 58 national list seats for allocation to qualifying parties using a compensatory mechanism which distributes seats based on surplus votes," votes not used to obtain a seat in the two primary tiers. The principle of the national list is to make the results more proportional globally by rewarding the losers from primary electoral levels. Votes for the national list come from the transfer of surplus votes from the SMD and territorial procedures. For each qualifying party the surplus votes will beits registered candidates' votes from the rst SMD round who did not win the contest, plus any unspent remainder votes left over from the territorial allocations, summed nationally. Seats unawardable in territories because of provision requiring two-thirds of a quota for the allocation of remainder seats are also added to the 58 national list seats, which in the past two elections has swelled to around 90 seats. All of these national pool seats are distributed proportionally using the d'Hondt procedure.
This complicated system originated in the regime change of 1989, where it was designed in a series of Roundtable negotiations between the ruling Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party and the newly-formed parties of the opposition. Those negotiations used a mostly SMD system as a point of departure, re ecting the initial preferences of the Socialist party. Opposition parties, however, strongly desired some form of proportional representation method which w ould mitigate their relative lack of nationwide exposure and organizational capacities. The most visible birth mark of the electoral law produced in the end was therefore the mixed-member system produced as a compromise among the two major bargaining sides.
Consequences Among the Electorate
The decision to provide each v oter with two separate ballots, cast simultaneously yet counted according to di erent rules, provided a valuable opportunity to electoral systems researchers in the form of a controlled comparative experiment. If institutions do in uence the behavior of voters, then provided that the rules for each ballot are su ciently di erent w e should expect different voting decisions even though the set of preferences for the political parties remains the same. Observationally this phenomenon is referred to as split" or split-ticket" voting, de ned as the situation in which an individual votes for a di erent party on her rst ballot than she does on her second ballot. In the speci c context of the Hungarian case, a split" vote is one in which the party sponsoring the candidate which the voter marks on her candidate ballot is not the same as the party named on her list ballot. 1 Three phenomena might explain split voting in the Hungarian context. First, a voter may be forced to split his vote because his most preferred party has not registered both a list and a candidate in his voting district. Since the registration barriers to establishing candidacies are much lower than those for lists, for example, many small parties eld candidates without also 1 The analysis which follows considers the split vote de ned in terms of rst-round ballots only. In addition, it looks only at parties that in a given observational unit e.g. polling station or voting district had both a list and a party-sponsored candidate. This sets the cuto point to whether a party has won any parliamentary seats, meaning that parties with consistently less than 5 percent of the vote are not examined. establishing lists. As the section on consequences for parties demonstrates, even larger parties found themselves in this situation due either to inability to eld candidates in every district or the decision not to because of non-competition pacts with other parties. Second, a voter may cast a list ballot for a party to which he feels closest, yet cast his other ballot for a an especially favored candidate of a di erent party, possibly even an independent candidate not eligible for a list. In this case the voter has a clear party preference yet in the speci c choice of candidates votes on criteria more personalistic than partisan.
Yet a third source of split voting could be for reasons of strategy, where a v oter's rst preference was for both the list and candidate of a single party, yet she gave her vote on either the list or candidate to a less preferred party after considering the probability of the outcome. The strategic choice could in theory be made on either ballot, depending on the expectation of the vote for the party in both types of constituency. In the rst type, the list ballot re ects the sincere choice and the vote for the candidate is strategic. In a general sense this means voting for a less-preferred candidate whose chances of victory are deemed higher than a those of a rst-ranked candidate. Yet two caveats speci c to the Hungarian context deserve mention. First, Hungary's run-o format mitigates this situation since the prize of the rst-round contest is in fact advancement to a second-round for the top three candidates. Yet advancement to the second round, as the 1998 election proved, may represent a substantial political prize as bargaining leverage with another party, even for parties whose candidates do not win the second round contest. This suggests that it is still likely that strategic voting will take away votes from the rst-round candidates with the least likelihood of winning, since as a more general rule, top-M runo elections can have at most M + 1 viable candidates" Cox 1997. The second caveat concerns the compensatory national list. Because SMD votes that are not cast for the winning candidate in the district are collected for the national compensation list, the disincentive t o w aste" votes at this level might also be mitigated. The extent to which this is true is di cult to con rm, although it has been repeatedly con rmed that the working of the national list is the least understood aspect of the electoral system. Finally, the newness of the Hungarian democracy might imply that the learning period of Hungary's electorate is not yet over, since strategic voting requires experience. Evidence presented below, however, shows that split-ticket voting appears to be increasing with each election.
In the second type of strategic voting, a party's candidate may have a high probability of winning in a speci c district, perhaps because of the candidates special popularity or concentration of support in a district, yet the party's list is deemed as unlikely to meet the 5 percent threshold necessary to qualify for both direct list and compensation list seats. The voter therefore votes for the candidate of his most-preferred party, since candidates are not subject to the minimum vote threshold, and then votes for the list of a lesser-preferred party more likely to meet the threshold so that his list vote is not wasted. In the election of 1998 there was strong evidence that voters and parties alike w ere aware of the critical role of the vote threshold. The search for evidence of split ticket voting may begin by comparing the aggregate percentages won on each ballot by each party at the district level. For the same electoral unit, the di erence in aggregate vote percentages will indicate the minimum level of split ticket voting, although without more information it is unreliable to make inferences about the maximum level of split voting in the individual units from only aggregate data. For instance, a district where the SZDSZ won 23.6 percent of the list vote and 10.1 percent of the SMD vote, at least 13.5 percent of the voters split their tickets. Table 1 presents information about split voting collected at the district level. Each gure represents the mean percentage won by each party at the district level, where district is de ned as the 20 list districts or the 176 single-member constituencies. In no case is the minimum split vote more than two percentage points, except for the curious election of 1998. 3 The result in this election of joint candidacies between Fidesz and the MDF 2 Roman Catholics Bishops circular, reported in MTI News, April 19, 1998. 3 This election was complicated by the existence of joint candidacies between Fidesz was to bring down the Fidesz SMD average relative t o its list average, and to raise the MDF's average in SMDs dramatically relative to its own list average. In the 1998 election the SZDSZ also appeared to do more poorly as a party than its candidates fared on average, while the MSZP candidates did slightly worse than their party list average. In all three elections, the mean Other scores indicate that other party lists always fare poorly than small party and independent candidates, probably because voters shy a way from wasting their votes on lists nearly certain to miss the 5 percent list vote threshold. Finally, the summary comparison of the e ective parties in the electorate," a measure which counts parties according to their vote shares, 4 indicates a very close correspondence between the concentration of support among voters between the two ballots. It also indicates an interesting trend that the average number of e ective parties in the electorate appears to be decreasing by one e ective party per election. Figure 1 graphs the relationship between list vote percentages and SMD vote percentages. Each point on the graph represents a district mean percentage for a single party in one election, taken from Table 1 . The dashed line on the diagonal represents the perfectly corresponding case of no split voting, although aggregate results falling on this line do not necessarily mean there was no split voting. Nonetheless, the results at the district level do not suggest a widespread pattern of split voting.
A ner look at the problem can begained by looking at smaller units: 10,822 polling stations which record aggregate information about both ballots, with an average of 413 valid votes cast in each polling station 1998. 5 Table 2 presents the results of a regression model charting the deviations from the dashed unit slope of 1.0. The results are from a polling-station level OLS regression of party SMD vote percentage on party list vote perand the MDF. Fidesz ran 52 of its candidates jointly with the MDF, while the MDF ran 26 of its own jointly with Fidesz. The SMD mean results in the last column of Table 1 consider a party's joint candidates equivalently to its non-joint candidates. 4 This quantity is commonly used in electoral studies to weight parties counts by their vote shares. It is calculated as 1= Of course, this is aggregate data when we are really interested in observing an individual-level phenomenon. A much better option would be the extension to larger tables of a method for inferring individual-level relationships from aggregate data, e.g. Gary King's method King 1997 . Work is currently ongoing on techniques for estimating cell entries in tables larger than 2 2 but is un nished. If available, huge inroads could be made into the split voting phenomenon by examining votes at the largest common electoral unit, e.g. the 176 single-member districts, using aggregate information from the 30-40 polling stations found in each single-member district. These results are currently only for 1990 and 1994, since the 1998 data was unavailable when I wrote this paper. For each party in each election, therefore, there are two estimated parameters: an intercept and a slope. The intercept estimate indicates the party's average candidate vote when its list vote was zero or very near zero. The slope coe cient indicates the correspondence of a party's SMD vote to its list vote. A pattern consistent with a lack of split voting would be the case where a party's intercept was zero and its slope estimate was 1.0. Slopes of less than 1.0 indicate that a party's candidates were less attractive than its list; conversely, a slope greater than 1.0 indicates that a party's candidates fared better than its lists. Since all units are proportions, the numerical values of the coe cients are straightforward to interpret. Table 1 , however, indicating that candidates fared better than lists, possibly because of voters' justi ed concerns that these parties' lists would not exceed the minimum threshold. Because of the ecological inference problem, however, these results should be viewed with circumspection.
The second half of Table 2 eliminates the party dummies from the regression model to contrast the two y ears. It indicates that more split-ticket voting took place in 1994 than in 1990, based on the observation that the aggregate di erence indicates the minimum split voting that occurred. The estimate of .95 indicates that the average party did better on its list than with its candidates.
A nal empirical method available for the investigation of split-ticket voting is to examine opinion polls taken immediately after the election. This has the bene t of avoiding the ecological problem by drawing on individuallevel data. Table 3 The o -diagonals in Table 3 provide direct evidence of split voting in the 1998 election. Each of the cells contains two percentages, one gure each for 6 Although the cell entries are presented as integers, the results were actually weighted according to demographic characteristics to correct slight v ariations in the sampling procedure. This explains why some columns do not appear to sum correctly. the row and the column. These percentages on the diagonal have an easily interpreted meaning. When the row percentage is less than 100, it indicates how many list voters for that party did not also choose its candidate. When the column percentage is less than 100, it indicates how many of the voters choosing that party's candidate did not also give that party their list ballots. The two gures are therefore quite useful in sorting out the two di erent kinds of strategic voting identi ed earlier. Row diagonal percentages less than zero would provide evidence consistent with the classic Duvergerian equilibrium associated with single-member districts. The MI EP result of 67.8 percent, for instance, indicates that approximately a third of the voters preferring this party on the list shunned this party's candidate in the SMD vote. The diagonal row percentages in fact drop to 80 percent and less after the fourth largest party, indicating tentative support for the M + 1 thesis. When the column diagonal percentage is less than 100, it most likely indicates the relative share of voters deterred from their preferred party's list because that party seemed unlikely to meet the minimum threshold: for example, the MDF candidate voters whose most common list choice was reportedly Fidesz, by 47.1 percent to 24.3. MI EP and the Munk asp art, both widely expected in opinion polls to bejust under the 5 percent threshold, both had approximately one in ve of their candidate voters choose the lists of other parties. Finally, this type of strategic logic also potentially explains many of the Other" voters whose rst choice parties either did not have lists or did not have lists expected to meet the threshold.
Overall the results indicate minor but not widespread split voting, most likely due to a combination of strategic concerns of the two types outlined previously. This phenomenon is di cult to di erentiate from voters with genuinely di erent preferences between candidates and parties as lists, however, since from the data presented here these may be observationally equivalent. The picture is further complicated by the runo format in the SMDs and by the knowledge that rst-round SMD votes cast for losing candidates will count for a compensation list. Nonetheless, the results indicate rough support for the M + 1 thesis in terms of strategic voting, in addition to the ve percent threshold apparently playing some role in voter decisions on their list ballots. Finally, based on the aggregate results from Table 2  and the survey results from Table 3 , split voting|at least the minimum split voting|appears to have increased with each election. This could be evidence of an increasingly sophisticated, and therefore increasingly strategic, electorate learning what sort of rewards and punishments are built into Hungary's electoral rules.
Consequences on Political Parties
Assessing the consequences on political parties of the di erent incentives o ered by the rules associated with the two ballots is a somewhat simpler task. The di erential e ect could occur in two ways. First, party decisions for entry may di er according to whether the constituency is an SMD or a list PR district. Second, the mechanical e ect of the rules will di erentially a ect how parties win legislative seats, according to whether it was an SMD or list PR district. This section discusses each potential consequence in turn.
Cox 1997 argues that the equilibrium for party entry in a district is also M + 1 . If M is taken as the three places available in the runo election, and we consider that the minimum list PR district magnitude is 4, then we would always expect the numberof parties entering lists to begreater than the number of parties entering candidates. In fact this is not the case, because of the linkage of SMD candidacies with the requirement for establishing lists in PR districts, and because of compensatory national list which makes even losing SMD votes desirable. The electoral law states that for a party to establish a list in a PR district, it must rst establish candidates in one-fourth of the SMDs contained in the larger PR district with a minimum of two. This, combined with the knowledge that losing party candidates in SMDs will still contribute valuable votes for allocation on the compensation list, give parties an incentive to establish candidacies in every district possible. This automatically leads to establishing as many lists as possible, something also necessary to collecting su cient nationwide votes to meet the 5 percent threshold. This is why we observe nearly full candidacies and lists for the major parties, with the exceptions explained by either small parties experiencing some organizational problems, or parties intentionally withholding candidates because they have agreed with another party to do so in advance Table 4 . For these reasons, the Hungarian district level makes a poor case to observe Duvergerian psychological e ects on party e n try. The only exception might be an e ect on very small parties, which are often unable to qualify for list seats, and independent candidacies, which are categorically ineligible for list seats. As shown in the last three columns of the Mean Other" row o f T able 4, small party and independent candidacies have been steadily decreasing with each election. One unambiguous di erence which the two ballot system produces in Hungary lies in the di erent mechanical e ects produced by the two sets of vote conversion rules. The majoritarian single-member districts, not surpris- Table 4 : Registered Lists and Candidates ingly, elect far fewer parties than the proportional mechanism of the larger magnitude PR districts. Table 5 compares the e ective numberof parties elected from the SMD ballots with those elected from the list ballots. 7 The results indicate that for Hungary's rst two elections, three fewer e ective parties were elected from the SMD system than from the list results. This dropped to 1 less e ective party in 1998, although the result was still nearly twice as many parties from the list system than from the SMD system. Finally, just as we s a w in the case of the e ective parties in the electorate, the number of e ective parties elected has been generally decreasing with each election. The last two r o ws in Table 5 compare the disproportionality of the outcomes at the aggregate level. The disproportionality of the list results, depending on the election and measure used, ranges from ve to almost seven times less disproportional as the SMD results. Election results for the system as a whole took a value within these extremes, because of the compensatory e ect of the national list based on votes from candidates and lists that did not win in the primary electoral tier. The result is quite unequivocal: the SMD ballot and the way it is counted is the primary source of disproportionality in the Hungarian system, balanced by the proportional list vote and the the extra compensation list. 7 These results are at the national level, since it would hardly be illuminating to point out that the average e ective parties elected from the SMDs was 1.0. To calculate the list results I re-ran the elections without the two-thirds remainder limit which in practice limits the allocation of list PR seats. My experiences in simulating a variety of elections under the Hungarian rules indicate that there is almost no di erence whether the list seats are allocated completely at the list district level or whether the unused surpluses and the unallocated seats are added to the national compensation list allocation.
Systemic Consequences
The nal type of consequence of Hungary's mixed-member system which remains to be assessed are various e ects it has on national politics and the system as a whole.
Although the Hungarian electoral rules are established on the principle that the SMD and territorial districts should yield roughly the same representation perseat, in practice the ratio of seats to registered voters in the SMDs tends behigher than in the list PR districts. By law the candidate districts each contain approximately 60,000 residents. The 20 PR districts for list allocation, on the other hand, are assigned district magnitudes according to population, and would require reapportionment of these numbers to adjust for future population shifts. In the 1998 election, for example, the number of eligible voters per seat in SMDs was about 45,700, compared with about 52,700 per territorial list seat. The SMDs ratios also tend to vary much more, a few having less than 28,000 eligible voters in a district. In addition, because of the rst-past-the-post" character of the second SMD round, it is possible to win a seat with far fewer votes than is required by the Hungarian largest-remainder PR rules which state that no remainder seat will be awarded to a party whose remainder is less than two-thirds of the quota. This meant, for example, that in 1998 the cheapest" SMD seat was won with just 6,973 votes, although the lowest remainder with which it was possible to win a seat in the list PR allocation was 12,878. This di erence is purely a product of the curious Hungarian two-thirds limit on PR remainder allocation, however.
A more subtle consequence of the two-ballot system is the di erent t ypes of candidacies that each ballot encourages. The tendency in SMD contests is for parties to place their most electable candidates for election in SMDs, and to ll the territorial and national lists with party faithfuls with less direct popularity or voter appeal. The law also permits candidates to run simultaneously in one SMD, in a district list, and on the national compensation list, giving parties a triple change to secure the election of their cadre. In 1994, for example, less than 10 percent of all candidates ran only in one SMD, while 40 percent ran on at least one list, and 30 percent ran in SMDs and both regional and national lists. Parties therefore tend to place the members whose election they consider most crucial at the top of both their territorial and national lists, as well as standing that candidate for election in a SMD, rather than submit them to the potential embarrassment of losing in a single-member district. For instance, in the hotly contested 1998 election, voters had no chance to directly choose either then-prime minister and MSZP leader Gyula Horn or Fidesz leader and current prime minister Viktor Orb an. These parties learned from the painful example of ex-communist Imre Pozsgay|widely favored in 1989 to become the rst elected president of Hungary|who lost his 1990 SMD race and entered parliament only because of the party list. Of the 33 total seats won by the Hungarian Socialist Party in 1990, only one came from winning an SMD contest. Likewise the Young Democratic Alliance and the Christian Democrats each w on 21 seats in 1990, yet only one and three respectively came from SMD contests. In both cases candidates who lost their individual contests became MPs because of the list mechanism. The lists, whose order and membership voters may not change on the ballot, are often criticized for just this reason: it gives parties the power to elect individuals from lists who would probably not have w on a direct contest with other candidates.
The national lists submitted by each party almost perfectly re ect the top leadership of each party, rather than the most popular political gures. While list placements tend to be the least transparent and most party-driven, even candidate selection at the SMD level re ects a signi cant amount of party strategy driven by national, rather than local concerns, with parties searching methodically for the best tactics and the best candidates, having learned from their own experience and from that of other parties both national and foreign" Ilonski 1999. Even the legal hurdles to establish SMD candidacies tend to punish small or independent organizations lacking the capacity to recruit candidates and collect 750 signatures per candidate.
Some mixed-member electoral systems|those of Russia and the Ukraine, for example|commonly result in the election of many independent candidates in the single-member constituencies, in contrast to the lists seats which only parties are eligible to contest. In Hungary, by contrast, this phenomenon is virtually non-existent because both the electoral rules and the structure of political competition is heavily party-oriented. Only parties may establish the territorial and national list from which together come nearly half of the seats in parliament, meaning that potential SMD-only independents have a better chance of winning by joining a party and getting placed on a list as well. Independents can and occasionally do win seats, of course, but only from SMD contests; both independent victories and independent candidacies are becoming increasingly rare. In the 1990 election, only 199 of 1,623 candidates ran as independents, and only 6 independents won their contests. These levels dropped to to 103 independent candidates in 1994 with no victories, and to just 53 in 1998 with just one gaining a seat.
It remains to betested whether legislators elected from SMDs behave di erently than those elected from lists. My non-systematic assessment of legislative behavior is that legislators tend to respond to their parties more than to their particular districts, although this should betested with evidence such as individual voting records or scores of constituency service. On the whole Hungarian parties tend to maintain a good measure of party discipline, although personality disputes have divided and even crippled some parties, particularly those of the right. For example, the Hungarian Democratic Forum, following its election defeat in the 1994 elections, split in 1996, split nearly in two when 15 of its 38-member parliamentary delegation left to form the Hungarian Democratic People's Party MDNP. The next year the Christian Democratic People's Party KDNP also split when the leaders could not agree on whether to form an electoral alliance with the Democratic Forum. Eleven of its 22-member delegation left to form the Christian Democratic Alliance, which later ran on MDF lists in the 1998 election. And were generally successful as a consequence, while the remaining KDNP won no seats in 1998. In principle we could examine whether the leaders of the breakaway parties were more often than not elected in SMDs rather than from party lists, the former suggesting possibly more independence and closer identi cation with a constituency rather than a national party organizations. In practice, however, the parties experiencing splits tend to have too few members elected from SMDs to make such analysis conclusive. For example, the MDF had ve members elected from SMDs in 1994, and two o f these left with the MDNP, although the leader Iv an Szab o had been elected from the Budapest list. In the case of the KDNP split, which had elected only three SMD candidates in 1994, only one left the party. Based on such evidence it is therefore di cult to conclude that SMD-elected candidates are less likely to follow party discipline. 8 Legislators could also be compared, of course, on the basis of constituency service according to whether they were elected in single-member districts or from party lists. Certainly there exists informal evidence to indi-8 Nonetheless, the size of the breakaway factions underscores the power of parties relative to candidates, a theme re ected at nearly every level of the system from parliamentary rules to the regulations governing candidacies at the local levels. Before the 14-seat victory by M I EP in 1998 led this rule to be challenged, parliamentary rules required a party t o hold 15 seats in order to be judged an o cial faction in parliament, a distinction carrying numerous procedural privileges including entitlement to representation on committees.
cate that SMD-elected MPs are loaded with small tasks that are di cult for government or central o ce o cials to ful ll Ilonski 1999, 100 1. To date, however, there has been no systematic evidence gathered on constituency service by Hungarian MPs, making this proposition also impossible to quantify or even verify.
The e ect of the mixed-member system on the organization of political competition, if anything, has served to reinforce the patterns present at the system's inception. All of the 6 parties that have repeatedly held legislative seats were key players in the round-table negotiations of 1989 which produced the mixed-member system. And the only new party to win seats|MI EP passing the list threshold by just half a percentage point in 1998|was formed from former members of the largest opposition force at the roundtable talks, the MDF. The system sometimes operates in unexpected ways, but together its majoritarian and proportional pillars have managed to maintain the electoral existence of nearly all of the original parties who designed it, alternatively rewarding them and salvaging them. The MSZP whose 1994 legislative majority w as due to the disproportional bonus from the list seats, for example, was saved from virtual non-representation in the 1990 elections by the proportional system|which ironically it had initially opposed in the round-table talks. The current g o verning party, Fidesz, won the 1998 election by forming alliances in the single-member district contests whereas its legislative presence in the previous two elections had rested nearly entirely on the proportional lists. The party system and the electoral system's fortunes have thus been closely linked since the beginning, and a signi cant c hange in one is only likely to occur in response to a signi cant change in the other. The nal section of this paper examines the prospects for such a c hange.
The Future of the Mixed-MemberSystem
Most electoral laws adopted during the Eastern European transitions from state-socialism have been signi cantly amended or changed entirely. Hungary is one of the few exceptions, and this has to do with the mode of its adoption and the party interests whose operation it reinforces. The law is not without its critics, mostly those citing its complexity and its ability t o produce counter-intuitive results, like giving the most total seats to a party who came in only second place in the total votes as it did with Fidesz in 1998. Yet the only substantive modi cations since 1989 have been minor, aimed either at slight modi cations of existing parameters|such as raising the original four percent threshold to ve in 1993|or at better ensuring the fair operation of existing procedures such as candidate registrations and ballot counting. Elites seem satis ed with the system, perhaps even taking pride in its complexity as do Hungarian lawyers in the complicated Hungarian legal system, and Hungarian accountants in their Byzantine tax law. The public by now seems habituated to a system in which v otes are straightforward to cast, if a bit ba ing to track in their complex conversion into seats. And party leaders, as I discuss in these nal comments, nd themselves facing a fairly stable equilibrium institution. No party with the power to signi cantly change the law has an incentive to do so, and no party who would bene t from a real change holds su cient p o wer.
One manipulative electoral law c hange successfully passed in 1997 by the MSZP and SZDSZ was to change the requirement for joint lists, in response to rumors that the opposition might form a grand coalition in the 1998 elections. Whereas formerly a two-party joined list needed 10 percent of the nationwide votes, the amended rule required each party on the joined list individually to poll ve percent for the joined list to be valid. 9 This of course eliminated the primary incentive for creating a joined list, and possibly explains why Fidesz and the MDF, while elding 78 joint candidates, did not establish a single joint list.
Neither this measure nor any other proposed measure, however, was aimed at altering the mixed-member system. Other proposals have included eliminating the second SMD round, adding 13 guaranteed seats for national and ethnic minorities, and further complicating the vote counting by linking the list distributions to the SMD seats which a party wins Benoit 1997. This last proposal, put forward by the SZDSZ in 1997, would have been aimed at redistributing the spoils from larger to smaller parties by adding further linkages between the SMD and list results. The e ect, however, would have been to reinforce the mixed-membersystem rather than to weaken it. None of these appears to bepoised to pass any time soon, however, and it is not coincidence that these calls for modi cation surfaced during an election year. In the discourse on electoral system reform the mixed-member system has never been a direct issue. The complexity to 9 At the time of the passage of this law in the summer of 1997, I w as working on a project in the Hungarian National Election O ce. I pointed out that if a list were joined, it would be impossible to know h o w many v otes were assigned to each individual" party. After a few days I received a sober reply that yes, this was a de ciency in the law, but that they had devised a complicated procedure to work around this.
which it contributes has long been a general issue, but this discussion concerns the multiple tiers and the vote-counting rules rather than the dualballot feature.
One of the stated programs of the government elected in 1998 is to reduce the size of parliament from its current 386 to between 200 and 250. This proposal is being considered alongside the need to formulate new regional administrative units for Hungary's planned accession to the European Union, which the current g o vernment considers a convenient v ehicle for also rede ning the electoral map. The move does not appear to beone of electoral manipulation; indeed, the parties backing the move appear to have few speci c plans for the new electoral law beyond the stated goal of preserving the basic character of the system. This is likely to mean that they will keep the mixed-member system and simply reduce the number of size of the existing districts. The reform will be di cult to pass, however, since the ruling coalition is far short of the two-thirds majority necessary to amend the election law. After three elections each part of the multifaceted Hungarian election law has provided some value to nearly every parliamentary party, while successfully excluding most challengers from the monopoly spoils. It would therefore bea highly unexpected result if Hungary should abandon its mixed-member system in the foreseeable future. All data used in this paper come from the computer archives of the Hungarian National Election O ce. Original and replication datasets are available from the author upon request.
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The Hungarian political parties referred to here are: MSZP, the Hungarian Socialist Party; Fidesz, the Fidesz-Hungarian Civic Party; FKGP, the Independent Smallholders' Party; SZDSZ, the Alliance of Free Democrats; MDF, the Hungarian Democratic Forum; KDNP, the Christian Democratic People's Party; MI EP, Hungarian Party o f T ruth and Party; and the Munk asp art, the Workers' Party.
